The purpose of this work is to establish what bank strategies in fixing the credit conditions are in an asymmetric information framework. In order to do this, we use a set of 8646 observations of Belgian small and medium sized businesses. The numerous empirical tests realized seem to indicate that banks do not use separating contracts to distinguish risks in a given population. The results of the tests on the use of pooling contracts are more ambiguous although it is shown that the charged rates do not represent correctly the future risk of borrowers. However, the study allows us to conclude that banks use a gradual acquisition strategy within the context of their customer relationships. In parallel, we bring to the fore the monopoly power of banks and the essential role of credit guarantee.
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Introduction
For three decades, asymmetric information has been the dominant theoretical viewpoint in financial intermediation theory. This trend has been so strong that this theoretical body has acquired some autonomy in finance. The study of many central subjects, such as banking firms' legitimacy or intermediated credit market functioning, has greatly benefited from the fact that this market imperfection has been taken into account. It is true that the asymmetric information hypothesis seems to account for a reality bankers face daily. Indeed, they have to evaluate a default risk that is unknown to them ex ante and that can evolve ex post, once the credit has been granted, because of decisions taken by the borrower without the bank's knowledge or due to uncertain events that might affect his financial situation.
The microeconomic analysis of commitment decisions taken by banks and of the resulting equilibria on the credit market is usually conducted under some behavioral hypothesis. In this way, a bank can interpret the signals sent by good firms willing to distinguish themselves from other firms of lesser quality. But a bank itself can also be more or less productive in its information creation activity. If this is the case, this activity is studied in conceptual and theoretical frameworks in reference to the credit contracts used at the moment of the commitment decision. These contracts have the advantage of being able to limit moral hazard risk and its consequences (incentive contracts) or to solve partially or completely the selection issue faced by credit dispensing financial institutions (separating, semi-separating or pooling contracts).
If informational asymmetry is a realistic hypothesis on which a coherent theory of financial intermediation can actually be constructed, then the premise asserting that banks are natural information producers can be questioned. From a 3/49 theoretical viewpoint, recent studies challenge this doctrinaire approach to financial banking (Allen and Santomero [1998] ; Bodie and Merton [1998] ; Rajan [1998] ).
Our research was motivated by the lack of empirical researches trying to understand the behavior of bankers that grant credits. Our aim is to fill this gap. More precisely, this work aims to test the different strategies banks can implement when they face asymmetric information (of adverse selection type) in order to cover themselves against the possible risks. Four strategies are tested. A pooling strategy, where the bank does not want to (or is not able to) distinguish the different borrowers in function of their potential risk. The consequence of such a strategy is that banks offer one type of credit contracts that are characterized by a single criterion, the interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] ). We also test two active strategies, where banks distinguish the different borrowers and offer them different contracts based on multiple criteria. The first active strategy consists in combining the interest rate and the guarantee (Bester [1985] and [1987] . The second active strategy combines the interest rate and a certain rationing level (Bencivenga and Smith [1991] ). Finally, we test for a progressive information acquisition strategy, this information is gathered through customer relationships.
We use a database of 8.646 small and medium sized businesses. We have the financial statements of these businesses for the period 1989-1995. This study completes some empirical studies that exist and extends the works of Pëtersen and Rajan (1994) , Berger and Udell (1995) , and of Körting (1998) . These three papers conclude that a customer relationship between banks and small and medium sized businesses exists. Based on a database of 3400 small and medium sized American businesses (less than 500 employees), Petersen and Rajan (1994) try to connect the characteristics of the credit contracts (interest rate, guarantees, credit availability) to objective characteristics of the bank -customer relationship (length of the relation, 4/49 number of banks that are partners etc…). The conclusion drawn by the study is that both credit cost and availability are affected by customer relationship. A dense customer relationship has two implications. On the one hand, we observe an easing of credit rationing (this result is confirmed by Cole [1998] ), but on the other hand we have the perverse effect of a cost increase. Hence, the authors confirm the conclusions of Greenbaum et al. (1989) , Sharpe (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1994) on banks' monopoly power. This negative externality concerns also large businesses that can limit the cost of their credit by having recourse to the bond market or by multiplying their customer relationships with banks (Houston and James [1996] ). With the same data, Berger and Udell (1995) show an additional effect of customer relationships, namely the effect on the guarantees required by banks. These guarantees tend to decrease as the quality of the customer relationship increases. More recently, Harhoff and Körting (1998) applied similar tests on a database of German small and medium sized businesses. They bring to the fore the bank credit concentration in Germany (on average a single bank supplies two thirds of the small and medium sized businesses).
They also confirm the fact that the quality of customer relationships affects positively credit availability and reduces the required guarantees. Their conclusions concerning the effects on the cost of credit are more ambiguous. D'Auria, Foglia and Marullo Reedtz (1999) try to answer this last question. Based on an eight year database of 2300 Italian medium and large businesses, the authors try do determine the effects of customer relationships on credit cost. They unambiguously conclude that customer relationships imply a decrease in the cost of borrowed money. This seems to contradict the hypothesis that banks have a monopoly power because of these dense customer relationships.
The contributions of our article to the existing literature are numerous. First, we re-introduce tests on customer relationships with the wider aim of analyzing 5/49 banks' credit decision behavior when they face adverse selection. In this more complete framework, we show that behaviors are based essentially on gradual information acquisition and that separating or pooling strategies are less important in determining these behaviors. Furthermore, we confirm the results of the studies mentioned above. More precisely, we show the effects of customer relationships on the guarantees requested by banks and on the monopoly power of banks that allows them to increase the credit cost. To these conclusions we add a new result that makes an objective characterization of firms entering in a customer relation with their bank possible. We show that actually the less risky the firm will reveal itself ex post, the stronger the intensity of the customer relation will be ex ante. The second contribution of this paper is methodological. Since we consider that banks use simultaneously several parameters that characterize credit contracts, when we test separating strategies and customer relations we systematically use appropriate estimation methods (two stages least squares in particular). Considering the statistical distributions, we systematically make use of non-parametric tests. As for the estimation and analysis of the significance level of the parameters, we have recourse to the Bootstrap technique introduced by Efron (1979) that is particularly appropriate in this case. The nature of our data set is the third contribution of the paper. Indeed, the empirical studies carried on the same subject have used data that comes from very particular financial systems. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) or Berger and Udell (1995) use American data (the American financial system being characterized by a very strong market influence) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents and justifies banks' behavioral hypothesis, the associated contracts and the models that
arise and have to be tested. Section three presents the methodology and the databases.
The results are presented in section four.
Banking strategies, contracts and the corresponding models

Strategies and contracts
The relationship between banks and borrowers in presence of asymmetric information (usually the asymmetry concerns the firm's economic risk) has motivated numerous works. These researches all fall within the same theoretical framework that of contract theory, named in reference to the underlying contractual hypotheses. We test four different possible behaviors of banks facing asymmetric information problems. We assume that banks can have three different types of strategies. They either have pooling strategies of the " Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) " type or more active strategies that aim at separating borrower's risk on the basis of multi-criteria contracts or finally gradual information acquisition strategies.
The first strategy, the pooling strategy (PE in the remainder of the text for "pooling equilibrium"), consists in suggesting a single contract to various types of firms. This strategy corresponds to the rationed equilibrium described by Stiglitz and system is known for its particularities. Traditionally, Italian firms diversify their capital suppliers. Padoa-Schioppa (1993) shows that firms having a balance sheet of more that 20 millions $ borrow, on average, from 10 different banks (versus 5 for the firms of the Houston and James [1996] sample).
Furthermore, the Italian study analyses big firms that usually have less asymmetric information problems. This is why we think that the conclusions of this paper cannot be transposed to other economies.
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Weiss (1981) . It supposes that the contractual interest rate asked by the bank is independent of the risk of a particular firm, although it reflects the average risk of borrowers. This strategy can randomly give rise to a rationed equilibrium for the firms. This is the case when, at a given interest rate, the demand is greater than supply and the expected increase in the interest rate has a far too important adverse selection effect. In this situation, the bank chooses not to change its lending conditions, and this leads to a durable rationed equilibrium of credit. Rationing affects all firms, independently of their risk.
Of course, some banks might not be satisfied with such passive strategies and prefer an active strategy. These strategies consist in choosing the potential borrowers through their choice of contract from a wide range of contracts constructed with the aim of achieving the best possible separation. This strategy (SE in the remainder of the text) supposes more complex credit contracts defined by at least two criteria.
In this framework, beyond the rate of interest, the credit contract must necessarily include a second argument. We therefore test a first hypothesis (SE1 in the following) in which the contract is completed by a level of required credit guarantee This contract is the one proposed by Bester (1985) . Less risky firms will then choose a contract with lower interest rate but higher level of guarantee. On the contrary, more risky firms will not be willing to choose such a contract, knowing that their risk level is higher and, therefore, that the probability of guarantee execution is higher.
Following this hypothesis (SE2 in the remainder of the text), the basic contract defined by the interest rate is completed by a rationing probability. We consider this probability as being endogenous and not the result of a market imperfection. The rationing probability is the equivalent of the guarantee in the preceding type of contract. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) have studied this contract in an endogenous growth model. This contract also captures the interest rate negotiation process of the 8/49
firms. Following their risk, known only by them, firms require from banks a certain interest rate. To these demands, banks respond by a more or less important rationing probability constructed in such a way that when anticipated by the firm and associated to the required interest rate, it forms with this rate a separating contract. Hence, it is a modeling of the interest rate negotiation process that falls within the framework of risk separation.
Between these extreme strategies, we also test the gradual information acquisition strategy in the framework of a customer relationship built through time (CR in the remainder of the text). In this setup, firms knowing that their are not very risky gradually build a client relationship with their banks knowing that they will increasingly benefit from it. By contrast, more risky firms avoid revealing their type.
The intensity of the customer relationship at a given time is then positively linked to the firm's quality as it shall later be revealed. Hence, firms engaged in such relations can expect a benefit that Petersen and Rajan have identified as an increased credit availability (a limited rationing) for firms that are seen by the bank as good risk.
However, it is more difficult to conclude on a possible relation between customer relationship and credit cost since by having such a relation with its customers the bank finds itself in a monopoly situation that can be harmful to the debtor (Petersen and Rajan [1994] ).
2.2.The Models
Our aim being to test the banking strategies in an asymmetric information framework, we considered that this asymmetry came from the operating risk (variable RISK). This variable, supposedly badly known by bankers, is an essential data for the 9/49 correct pricing of the risk premium (Merton [1974] ). Conversely, when analyzing the credit file, the person in charge of the customers and particularly of the file has at its disposal relevant information that should also be taken into account in the ex ante risk assessment. These informations make up for as many control variables in the model to be tested. These variables are intended to capture effects on particular elements defining the contracts considered other than that of asymmetric information, namely, the interest rate (INTER) and the collateral (COLLAT) or implicit elements characterizing the contracts such as the rationing (RAT) and the customer relation intensity (CUSTOM).
The control variables
We suppose that at the time of the bank's decision to agree, the bank takes into account in its decision and in the determination of the parameters of the contract objective elements such as the firm's size (SIZE). A bigger size is usually linked to a lesser fragility and a lower bankruptcy risk.
The same stands for the legal status, known by the bank, and the specific risk factor. Indeed, besides the fact that the status in itself determines shareholder's responsibility, it imposes specific equity capital constraints. This implies that the juridical status is the cause of a more or less important implication of the manager and the shareholders. Hence, it is logical to consider that in an individual company having adopted the partnership status, the personal responsibility of the company manager is very strong. This increased implication reduces the moral hazard risk of bad management. This is less true for limited liability companies.
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The financial leverage (LEVER) is probably, among all the considered control variables, the most unquestionable. All other things being equal, increased indebtedness induces a more important default risk.
Asset specificity (SPECIF) seems to be an additional control variable considered by the banker in its commitment decision. The parameter intervenes particularly when the banker considers the potential difficulties a debtor may face and that subsequently will affect the banker himself. In these circumstances, the assets specificity is an aggravating risk factor in two respects. On the one hand, this specificity decreases the firm's strategic flexibility, if for example it desires to reorganize its activities. On the other hand, specificity is against the creditor's interest in case of asset liquidation since the narrower the secondary market is (or even non existant ) the weaker will the asset price be. All this being, we are conscious that the status of this variable is very ambiguous. Indeed, one can ask if it is a control variable, and hence known to the bank with no associated cost, or if it is a risk bearing factor, and hence not known to the bank ex ante. We chose the first alternative, even if the econometric results might contradict it latter.
The average debt maturity (MATUR) of the firm is an additional control variable known to the banker and directly influencing the banker's decision in three ways. First, as soon as the interest rates structure is not flat, the average maturity conditions the company's effective credit cost. Second, the average maturity itself is a risk factor. All other things being equal, the commitment implied by a short maturity is much weaker than the one implied by a long maturity. Conversely, if we take an information transfer viewpoint, a long maturity can be interpreted as a signal for the new creditor that the firm at hand is of good quality, thing that could explain the previous creditor's long commitment.
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The firm's economic sector (SECTOR) is also an additional factor of risk objectively known by the banker. These economic sectors are in open economies and are subject to economic shocks. However, each sector having its own cycle with its own weaknesses, their reactions to these shocks are of different magnitudes and take place in a non synchronized way.
The amount of the collateral (COLLAT) on the liabilities side of the balance sheet is an information known to the banker at the time of his decision to commit.
This parameter informs him of the ranking of his claim in the case of a bankruptcy followed by a liquidation. It also informs him of the firm's risk assessment made by other creditors. Concerning the status of this variable, an ambiguity arises following the tested strategy. Indeed, if we test a pooling strategy (PE) or a separating strategy based on rationing (SE2), it possible to consider that this information is related to an external risk factor since these guarantees, taken by other banks, will have priority in case of liquidation. In this case, this variable is indeed a control variable. Conversely, if we test a separating strategy based on guarantees (SE1), then this variable is no more a control variable but rather an endogenous parameter of the contract and consequently a decision variable. In order to distinguish the status of the variables (decision or control) we consider in the remainder of the paper that a decision variable will always be written in italics whereas a control variable will always be in normal characters. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, in the next section, that presents the structure of the tested models, all the above variables will be considered a single variable (CONTROL). However, this variable will be specific to each equation.
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The models
Considering that the financial institutions' decisions are taken at date t depending (or not) on an economic risk that will be revealed at date (t, t+k), the tested models are the following :
-Pooling strategy
If the control variables are correct, we expect the coefficients b to be significantly different from 0. If banks have pooling strategies, we expect the coefficient c to be equal to 0, since the risk is unknown and does not influence the interest rate. This model will be completed by an independence test of the variables INTER and RISK.
-Separating strategy with collateral (SE1)
When such a strategy is adopted, the bank jointly determines the interest rates and the collateral within the context of its supply of separating contracts. The borrower will choose the contract that best fits his risk. The best borrowers signal themselves by choosing a contract with high guarantees and a lower interest rate. This leads us to test a two simultaneous equations model in which, besides the control variables, two decisions variables intervene.
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INTER it = a + b.CONTROL it + c.RISK it,t+k + d.COLLAT it + e it (2)
Here, we expect c to be positive and c' to be negative; coefficients d and d'
have to be negative.
-pooling strategy with rationing (SE2)
Here, rationing is no more the consequence of a market imperfection but rather an action variable used by the bank in order to separate the different risks. The structure of the model is the same as that of the preceding one, with COLLAT being replaced by RAT.
We expect c to be positive and c' to be negative. The coefficients d and d' have to be negative. In the two preceding models (SE1 and SE2), the choice of the control variables will be done on the basis of specific considerations. In particular, we will look at their exogenous effect on the dependent variables but keeping in mind the problem of model identification.
14/49 -Strategy based on the customer relationship (CR)
The tested model is the following
In the above equation, we expect a negative c coefficient to be negative since a risky firm will be reluctant to enter in a customer relation that would end up revealing its true risk level. This customer relation will progressively be built between banks and their good customers and will benefit the two parties. It is obvious that the main advantage for the banks is the information made available through this contact and the low agency costs. For the firms, the advantages of such a customer relation are numerous. It can be the increased availability of credit and a lower rationing, this is showed by Petersen and Rajan (1994) . The same authors notice that this compensates for the paradoxical overcost bore by firms that have entered in such a relation. This can be justified if we consider the monopoly power the bankers develop in such a relation. Hence, it is important to test those two hypothesis (equations 7 and 8).
However, if we analyze further the problem, we can consider that, in return of such a relation, firms expect the bank to decrease its demands concerning the collateral.
Indeed, the cost of putting these guarantees together can be quite important. These costs can be direct or indirect (agency costs due to the reluctance of other lenders that are not covered by similar guarantees). The validation of this hypothesis leads us to equation 9. Finally, it is likely that these three bank's reaction variables are simultaneously adjusted by the bank itself which implies that we have to introduce in each one of the three equations the two other reaction variables and consider them as 15/49 explanatory variables. We end up with the following system of simultaneous equations.
RAT it = a1 + b1.CONTROL it + c1.CUSTOM it + d1.INTER it + g1.COLLAT it+ eit (7) INTER it = a2 + b2.CONTROL it + c2.CUSTOM it + d2.RAT it + g2.COLLAT it+ eit (8) COLLAT it = a3 + b3.CONTROL it + c3.CUSTOM it + d3.RAT it + g3.INTER it+ eit (9) In equations 7, 8 and 9 the rationing, the interest rates and the guarantees are taken as decision variables, which implies that we use variations between t and t+k.
We expect a negative c i (i= 1, 2 or 3) coefficient in at least one of the three equations.
This will depend on the form the compensation of the customer relation, i.e. which of the three forms presented above it will take. We cannot rule out the possibility of a positive coefficient c 2 in equation 8 if the banks manage to effectively exploit the monopoly power implied by the building of a customer relationship.
Data and methodology
3.1.Data and sample
The data we use to test the models presented in the above section are Belgian.
The National Bank of Belgium (BNB) collects each year the statement of accounts of 200.000 companies (this number takes into account both companies that hand in 16/49 shortened or unabridged statements 5 ) and undertakes their computerized archiving.
Since 1989, when the BNB receives the statements of accounts of a company a number of consistency tests are implemented (these tests consist mainly on the one hand in checking the successive adding ups of information and on the other hand in cross checking the data coming from the balance sheet and those coming from the appendices 6 ). If a mistake is discovered, a correction demand is sent to the company.
The BNB has no constraint power and thus has not always the necessary information in order to make the corrections. Hence, one should be careful when using the data distributed on the CD-ROM. The first step of our work was to test once again the data using the BNB's procedure in order to eliminate all erroneous statements. We also paid particular attention to the fact that the Belgian accounting nomenclature was modified during the period under study.
Our objective being the analysis of the behavior of a significant sample of small and medium sized businesses 7 during the period that interests us we used the following selection criteria:
5 A company has to hand an unabridged statement of accounts when two of the three following criteria are met: 50 employees on the payroll, a balance sheet exceeding 100 millions BeF (2.489€ millions) or 200 millions BeF (4.958€ millions) of turnover. Annually, between 12000 and 15 000 companies meet this condition during our analysis period.
6 Until 1996, a private consulting firm did the distribution of the CD-ROM with this data. Since 1997, the BNB distributes itself the CD-ROM. The raw data obtained this way was reprocessed in order to make exploitable in a relational database. We stress the fact that the nomenclature of the statements of accounts is highly standardized in Belgium (every element of the balance sheet and of the operating account have a specific code), hence, the analysis of the data with the use of computers is highly simplified.
7 Indeed, the problem of information asymmetry seems to be very important for this type of firms.
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-The annual statements of balances have to be available for every year studied.
-The firm must have positive equity capital (since if it is not the case, some ratios have no meaning and the analysis becomes much trickier).
-The size of the company, given by the total of the assets, has to be in 1989 between 20 (0.596) and 500 (12.39) millions BeF (millions of euros) (below the lower bound, many juridical structures have no more the logic of a company, above the highest bound the problems of asymmetric information are limited because of the increased visibility of the firm) 8 .
-The activity sectors "Credit institutions -insurance -company servicesrenting" and "other services" have been excluded (since they follow another logic).
-The firms must have financial debts in 1989 (it seems to us that it is quite difficult to analyze the behavior of financial institutions concerning firms that do not deal with them…)
The simultaneous application of our criteria gave us a sample of 8646 companies. Figure 1 shows a histogram of the sizes.
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3.2.Financial indicators
Based on the information contained in the statements, we constructed some financial indicators. The indicators we use are presented in table 1. The reading of this table asks for the following comments:
1) The variables TYPE and SECTOR represent the legal form of the firm (limited liability company, partnership…) and its activity sector (43 sectors are considered)
respectively.
2) Unless specified otherwise, the control variables (CONTROL), that summarize the objective information available to the bank at the moment of its decision to provide credit, are calculated in 1989 using the accounting documents of that year.
3) The decision variables of the financial institutions (requested collateral, interest rate, level of rationing) are also computed using accounting information and not on the basis of contractual data. Consequently, they have been built with variations of the corresponding data between 1989 and 1995. This way of proceeding allowed us to focus on the decisions taken by financial institutions (Did the bank decide to raise the rate during the considered period or did it decrease it?, …).
4) The fact that we studied the variations of the rate between 1989 and 1995 has also made it possible to circumvent an important methodological difficulty. Indeed, the study of the charged rate for a given year gives surprising results. The rates obtained are frequently very high. Two explanations are possible (and probable):
either a certain number of firms have recourse to seasonal borrowing, and this is 19/49 not detectable on the end year balance sheet, either some firms, when they are close to the end year statements, temporarily "clean" their situation, this is known as window dressing. Our approach has the additional advantage of neutralizing those two problems.
5) The construction of a rationing indicator is not an easy task. Indeed, it is impossible to directly measure the phenomenon. The solution to this problem consists in evaluating the rationing by measuring how much firms have recourse to more expensive substitution credit or to credit lower in the external financing hierarchy. A firm shall have recourse to this type of financing only if it has no more access to classical lending. To tackle this problem, Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest looking at the credit offered by suppliers when it is more expensive than credit offered by banks. Harhöff and Körting (1998) use the same methodology. It seems that this choice can be disputed if one looks at the results of Biais and Gollier (1997) . Indeed, they consider that the suppliers have access to privileged information concerning the firm. Hence, the fact that they lend money to the firm is a signal used by the bank in its decision to give credit. This reasoning leads us to the conclusion that the credit offered by the supplier and the credit offered by the bank are complementary 9 , hence the importance of an indicator other than the supplier's credit in order to estimate extent of the rationing. Cook (1997) confirms this result. In view of these considerations and of the small and medium sized businesses' practices, we chose to measure the extent of the rationing by referring to the relative weight of the social and fiscal debts.
The observation of the behaviors shows that indeed, when firms face cash flow problems, they delay the payments of this kind of debts. The financial penalties 9 Berger and Udell (1998) show that this complementarity is also temporal: the credit offered by the supplier being a prerequisite for the bank credit.
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are then prohibitory. In view of all these problems, the indicators for the rationing ratio we propose is the following:
Rationing indicator: fiscal and social debts / total debts
The use of this indicator is subject to three criticisms:
a) The fluctuations of the ratio are linked to the date on which the corporate taxes are accounted for by the firm.
b) The use of this gross indicator can lead to important distortions following the economic sector studied. This is because of, among others, the differences in the added value between sectors (the added value determines the amount of the fiscal debt found under the title "VAT to be paid") and the differences in the production structures of the sectors (that determine part of the social debt found in the balance sheet).
c) The amount of the corporate taxes depends on the characteristics of the firms (the size in particular).
In view of these three criticisms we chose as a measure of the rationing, the variation of the ratio defined above during the period considered. We named this variable RAT.
6) The test of a gradual information acquisition strategy implies of course that the intensity of the customer relation has to be measured. Ideally, we would like to have objective elements measuring the relation intensity such as the number of banks working with the firm, the variety of products purchased by the firm at the bank etc… On the sole basis of the accounting information this measure turns out to be very delicate. However we can consider that the banks trusting a particular debtor will accept more easily a long-term relation and hence deny themselves the 21/49 possibility of frequent renegotiations that are possible with short term credits.
Symmetrically, good firms willing to build up dense relations with their bank will not hesitate to commit themselves since unlike short run credit that allows firms to change bank, long term debt binds the firm to its bank for a long period 
The objective was to find a measure that makes sense to a banker and that is close to the idea of bankruptcy risk. This is why, on the period under study, we find the lowest cash flow of the firm and then we calculate the difference between the first period cash flow and the minimum found. Then, we divide this difference by the initial value of the equity capital in order to obtain a measure of the insolvency risk. In the face of such problems (that should not surprise a reader used to the problems faced when dealing with balance sheet data), the following pre-processing has been applied:
3.3.Pre-processing of the data and data distribution
-All processing was done to standardized variables in order to homogenize the variable metrics.
-The variables' distributions where bounded (in an arbitrary fashion) on a range considered economically significant, and in order to avoid some atypical data that could influence the results.
Appendix 3 contains the graphics of the distributions of the different variables once they were pre-processed.
11 Appendix 1 presents the results obtained with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the different dependent variables used. The normality hypothesis is rejected in all cases at a very high confidence level. Bootstrap was introduced by Efron (1977) and has received particular attention since the early eighties. Numerous books (Efron and Tibshirani [1993] , LePage and Billard [1992] and Noreen [1989] 12 among others) present this technique and its limits. The basic idea of this approach is the following: when a sample of n individuals is observed, two difficulties can make the analytical approach unusable to characterize the sampling distribution of a given statistic. Either the form of the population distribution corresponds to no known distribution, either (/or) the statistic is far too complex. To estimate the statistic's variability (standard error, distribution or any other useful measure) after the sampling process, we use a re-sampling
23/49
3.4.Statistical and econometric methods
procedure. An important number of random samples are drawn with replacing in the initial sample. For every one of these samples, the bootstrap samples, the statistic under study is computed. Hence, we evaluate the variability of this statistic using the distribution obtained with the n bootstrap samples. The extension of this approach to hypothesis testing is nearly natural. The same procedure is followed (drawing of n independent bootstrap random samples with replacement, computation of the n values 24/49 of the statistic tested and construction of its distribution) but we have to make sure that the sample generation process respects (by construction) the tested null hypothesis. Efron and Tibshirani (1986 and 1993) in Gujarati [1995] or in Greene [1997] ). Not being able to use the normality hypothesis we used a bootstrap approach in order to conduct all the significance tests.
Concerning the application of bootstrap methodology to Hausman's test we followed Wong's (1996) recommendations. The application of bootstrap methodology to 12 One should note that Noreen's book, even if it refers many times to the bootstrap, describes more generally a set of numerical techniques adapted for hypothesis testing.
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regressions was done via a "residual" approach 13 , suggested, among others, by Freedman (1981) . The application of the bootstrap methodology to two stage least squares was also based on Freedman (1984) 14 . The results showed are based on estimations done on 1000 bootstrap samples. The p-values showed were built with a percentile confidence interval approach. The approach consists in building a distribution of the estimators under the null hypothesis with the bootstrap procedure (re-sampling in the original sample) and in evaluating the statistical significance level of the estimated coefficients with respect to the distribution of the estimators (Efron and Tibshirani [1993] , p168 and f.).
3.5.Economic environment of the study
The evolution of the short-term interest rate in Belgium during the period under consideration is showed in figure 2 (3 months Bibor rate). The decrease of the interest rates is impressing. One should not be surprised by the fact that the variable INTER (cf. Table 2 ) has a average negative value of 1.23% (may we should be surprised by the fact that it is only of 1.23%…). We will keep this in mind for the interpretation of the results (particularly for the value of the constant in the regression models that use INTER as a dependent variable). 13 The residuals of the basic regression are re-sampled in order to build, with the help of the estimation of the parameters, "noisy" dependent variables that constitute, with the basic explanatory variables, the bootstrap samples. The sampling distribution of the regression's parameters is then obtained by applying the regression model to the bootstrap samples.
14 We paid particular attention to the "orthogonalisation" of the residuals of the basic estimation with respect to the instruments before proceeding to the re-sampling (Freedman [1984] , p 834).
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Results
4.1.Preliminary results
The preliminary results concern two sets of tests that bring to the fore the eventual dependencies between the decisional variables and the sign of the correlation between these different indicators respectively.
Level of dependency of the decisional financial data
The table 3 shows the results of the usual independence tests for the variables of rates, guarantees and rationing.
The analysis of the results of the Chi square test shows that we can reject, with near certainty, the hypothesis of independence of the variables that characterize the variations of the interest rate, the amount of the collateral, the credit rationing, the risk and the intensity of the customer relationship.
If from the test results, we are not able to grasp the function of a particular financial variable in the banking strategy, it appears now that the parameters of the credit contract that we study are greatly determined by the banks' decision process.
We now clarify the meaning of the correlation between the different variables.
Correlation between the decision variables
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The analysis of the correlation at the level of the total population (table 4) Such results seem to contradict the use of separating strategies by credit institutions. Indeed, the use of such strategies that separate the borrowers necessarily imply that the decision variables move in different directions (negative correlation).
However, the general nature of this study implies that we should confirm this fact by an analysis of the test results of the different models built in the first section.
4.2.Interpretation of the regression results
The table found in appendix 2 summarizes the results for the PE, SE1, SE2
and CR models on the whole sample. 1) The test of the pooling strategy (PE model) allows to simultaneously verify if the strategies followed by the banks are globally blind concerning economic risk and determine the explanatory factors of the rates charged by banks. Concerning the second objective, it comes out that the control variables considered are frequently significant and explain the variation of the rate. This is why the maturity level of the debt at the beginning of the period is significant. The more the initial debts are short term debts, the less the increase of the rate will be subsequently (t: -3.62 / p-value: 0%). Two explanations are possible for this. A first one is that banks may consider long term debt as an additional risk factor and pay more attention to this parameter than to the financial leverage that is not significant. Another explanation, which seems to us more plausible, consists in explaining this result economically: during the period under considerations, since long term rates were more inert than short term rates, firms having borrowed on the long term benefited less from the decrease of the rates.
Having this in mind, it is useful at this point to remember that we have no information on the credit contracts and on the nature of the charged rates (fix or variable), which prevents us from choosing with certainty one of the two options above. The level of the initial guarantees is also an explanatory element of the rate charged by banks. A firm with a higher initial level of guarantees will obtain a cheaper credit than a firm with a lower initial level of guarantees (t: -4.02 / p-value: 0%). This can be even better explained if there is stability in the banking relation, since then there is consistency in the bank's behavior, the bank considering that the increased level of guarantees explains by itself the lower rate. Quite surprisingly, the size does not seem to be taken into consideration by the banker in its price strategy. This conclusion contradicts the results obtained by Petersen and Rajan (1994) in the United States. However, it seems that there are sectorial pricing strategies (t= -2.29 / p-value: 3.5%). Similarly, the juridical status is not neutral and influences the credit cost (t: 2.82 / p-value: 0.8%). A
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company having the status of a partnership will be considered as riskier than a limited liability company. More generally, the model is not satisfactory. The determination coefficient is very weak, and if the variable RISK does not influence the rate's variations, then the model has not sufficient explanatory power and we cannot draw the conclusion that the strategies followed by the banks are pooling.
2) Concerning the separating strategy built on the basis of a simultaneous use of the rates and the guarantees by the banks (SE1 model), the results are much clearer. Indeed, the model seeks to determine simultaneously the charged interest rate and the guarantees required by the bank (the results of the application of bootstrap procedure to Hausman's specification test confirm a very high significance level (pvalue =0 for 1000 bootstrap samples) the interdependence of the two equations). The observation of the control variables shows that a high level of guarantees at the beginning of the period (equation 3) prompts banks to ask on average less additional guarantees (t: -16.871 / p-value: 1%). Probably we should consider the fact that banks consider the advantage of a guarantee if it is not drowned in a large set of guarantees that would give to each a weak relative advantage. Here also we have a sectorial effect (t: -2.46 / p-value: 1.8%). A shorter maturity is also an element that reduce the level of the guarantees (t: -2.1 / p-value: 9.6%). For this regression, the variable RISK is not significant, even if it has the expected sign. This variable is not significant in equation 2 (that explains the charged rate), although, again, it has the expected sign (t:
-0.291 / p-value: 0.43%). The other control variables are not significant. From all this we conclude that banks do not seem to be using separating strategies based on the use of the pair (rate, guarantee) in order to distinguish risks in a given population of small and medium sized businesses.
3) The separating strategy that includes the credit rationing variable (SE2 model) does not seem valid either. Indeed, concerning the determinants of the 31/49 rationing (equation 5), none of the explanatory variables is significant. We have no sectorial effect, nor have we any influence of the juridical status. The only financial variable that is significant is the financial leverage. On the one hand, firms having the biggest debts are proportionally more rationed than the average firm is. On the other hand, however, in equations 4 and 5, we see that risk is not significant, which leads us to reject the hypothesis of separation on the basis of rationing. This negative conclusion is backed by the fact that even though the rate has an influence on the rationing (t: 11.262 / p-value: 0%), the contrary is not true.
4)
The result obtained for the equations of the CR model, that tests the building of client relations and its consequences, are more interesting. First, in equation 6 the variable RISK is significant and negatively correlated with customer relationship (t: -1.762 / p-value: 2%), and this is a result by itself. This result is the same that Petersen and Rajan (1994) found: the less risky firms will enter in a closer customer relationship.
What are the advantages for each side in the long run? The answer is threefold (and Hausman's specification test confirms the interdependency of these three aspects).
First of all, the customer relationship has a significant impact on the interest rate asked by the bank (equation 8). This result is similar to that of Petersen and Rajan (1994) who were the first to bring to the fore what would later be described as the "hold-up" problem. The intensity of the customer relationship seems to induce an increase of the rates charged by the bank (t: 1.859 / p-value:1.4%). Hence, we can conclude that there exists a monopoly power of the banks over small firms that is a corollary to the establishment of a customer relation that seeks to limit the information asymmetry. Our conclusions are closely akin to those of Rajan (1992) and Thakor (1996) .
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Furthermore, our results show that the intensity of the customer relation influences the credit rationing (equation 7). We observe that the ties between the firms and the banks are stronger the more important the rationing is (t: 2.284 / p-value:
0.2%). It is clear that such a result, that contradicts those of Petersen and Rajan (1994) , is surprising, and even paradoxical. Indeed, such a stronger customer relation implies a better information of the bank about its customer. This should reduce the information asymmetry. Yet, the credit rationing is a consequence of information asymmetry (Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] ). Hence, we should expect a decrease in the credit rationing. Two reasons seem to justify this result. First, the captive firm, that faces prohibitive rate may try to discipline the bank by having recourse to nonbanking credit, that might even be more expensive. The bank is then penalized by the fact that the demand of good firms is inferior to the one expected in a monopoly situation. This result is very logical since it specifies the reaction of a firm facing a monopoly power exercised at its detriment. In fact, it seems us unrealistic that the banks could conduct such an expropriation of the firms' rent with no reactions on the part of the firms. This result deserves in our sense more formal theoretical research. A second explanation seems to lie in the nature of the customer relation that drives firms to commit for longer terms with their banks. What happens when these firms have short-term credit needs? If they appeal to their bank they take the risk of sending a negative signal. We conclude that, in order to avoid the deterioration of its signal, a firm will prefer to have recourse to a short-term non-banking credit, even though it is more expensive.
However, firms that have customer relations with their banks usually have to provide lower guarantees. This is somehow a compensation for the negative effects on the rates and on the credit availability. Equation 9 confirms this intuition (t: -7.868 / p-33/49 value: 0%). Our results concerning this point are similar to those of Berger and Udell (1995) as well as to those of Harhoff and Körting (1998) . We conclude that the compensation expected by small firms for the establishment of customer relations is not a lower credit rationing nor favorable debit conditions but rather lower average guarantees.
Finally, we stress the fact that we also carried out a sector based analysis (building industry, wholesales trading and retail trading) and that the results obtained are globally very similar to those obtained when working on the whole population of firms.
Conclusion
In this paper we have tried, based on a population of 8646 small and medium sized Belgian businesses whose behavior was observed on a period extending from 1989 to 1995, to give a first empirical solution to the problem of identifying bank strategies of credit conditions fixing. In order to achieve this goal, we tested the four following strategies, that all have been thoroughly studied in the theoretical literature:
-Pooling strategy (Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] ); -Separating strategy based on rates and guarantees (Bester [1985] ); -Separating strategy using rationing (Bencivenga and Smith [1991] ); -Gradual information acquisition strategy (Petersen and Rajan [1994] in particular).
The results show that the most probable strategy is the last one, the one where we have a gradual information transfer in the framework of the customer relationship established between small and medium sized businesses and their banks. In particular, 34/49 the smaller the firms are, the more they establish dense customer relationships. This can be explained by the fact that information asymmetry is more important for small firms. To this explanation we can add the fact that small firms, for organizational reasons, limit by themselves the diversity of their suppliers of credit capitals and concentrate on a small number of banks. Another important result is that small and medium sized businesses benefit from the customer relationship through lower guarantee requirements. This result, that is new in the literature, offers an alternative to the conclusions drawn by Petersen and Rajan who consider that the benefits of a customer relationship lie in the increased credit availability. Like the abovementioned authors, we observed that this customer relationship helps banks acquire a monopoly power that they use to capture part of the firms rent.
We also obtained other results that allow us to assess the way banks fix the contract conditions they offer to their customers. First, the charged rate does not seem very sensible to the specific risk of a firm and seems to depend on observable objective elements such as the sector or the juridical status of the firm. Hence, it seems that firms have a cursory approach to the fixing of the interest rates. Credit rationing also seems to depend on an observable and objective parameter, namely the financial leverage. It is also independent of the specific risk of a firm. The guarantees taken by banks seem however, to be a crucial element in the banks' commitment strategy. They are mainly affected by the level of the initial guarantee (fear of a dilution problem), but also by more subtle elements such as the customer relationship's intensity.
These results were obtained from accounting data. Having to capture the bank's decision, we had to work on variations of the rate, the guarantee and the rationing level. The information we obtained this way is certainly not as precise as the one we would obtain if we had worked with the credit contracts. However bank 35/49 secrecy prevented us from obtaining this information. Furthermore, we could even consider the possibility of differing strategies from one bank to another. All these elements clearly explain why the determination coefficients are so low for the models we tested. These limits should prompt economists to work in a more detailed fashion on the data and even, if possible, to work on contractual data, in order to contribute to a better understanding of the banks' commitment strategy in an asymmetric information setting. * for dummy variables, we indicate t-value and NP-value of the most significant modality. The coefficient value is not indicated since it changes from modality to modality. ** probability associated with the student-t test calculated following the approach described at section 3.4 of the paper. 
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